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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
Title of Dissertation: Improving Maritime Surveillance in Kenya’s 
remote Coastal Islands: Application of renewable 
energy solutions. 
 
Degree: MSc 
 
Maritime Surveillance encompasses tools and activities designed to enable 
governments gain understanding of everything in the maritime environment that can 
pose security threat. Such threats can take the form of piracy and armed robbery, 
organized crime such as, human and drug trafficking, smuggling, illegal exploitation 
of marine resources or the destruction of marine resources through dumping and 
pollution. Kenya’s geographical position, in the vicinity of a piracy prone region 
inevitably puts her at risk. 
This thesis analyses Kenya’s maritime surveillance regime as currently constituted, 
with a view to identifying gaps and possible areas for improvement. The absence of 
grid connection has often been cited as a major handicap to the installation of robust 
electronics for maritime surveillance. The Kenyan Maritime Administration, which has 
the overall regulatory mandate on maritime affairs in Kenya was incorporated in May 
2004 and is in the process of setting up the necessary infrastructure for maritime 
surveillance. Among the projects earmarked for prioritization in this regard is a coastal 
surveillance system. Of particular concern are remote Islands making up the Lamu 
archipelago, near the maritime boundary with Somalia. 
It is very difficult to change or upgrade an energy system after it has been established. 
In order to choose the right system and technology for a specific application, budget, 
and geographical location, it is important to take into account all the underlying factors 
and externalities. This helps in avoiding future switching costs while rendering the 
performance of the selected option more efficient. In terms of maritime surveillance, 
each region presents unique challenges, which need to be specifically investigated, 
in order to leverage available facilities and capabilities in the context of inter-agency 
engagement. 
This thesis concludes that with the available energy resources in Kenya, and mature 
status of wind and solar energy technologies, maritime surveillance of remote outlying 
coastal islands in Kenya can be greatly improved through renewable energy power 
solutions. The aim is therefore to deliver powerful information for decision-makers 
responsible for planning in the maritime administration. 
 
KEY WORDS: Maritime Surveillance, Situational Awareness, Renewable 
Energy, Levelised Cost of Energy (LCOE). 
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1 CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
1.0 Background 
The approach to ports, coastlines and navigation channels constitute vital 
transportation infrastructure that require protection from a myriad of risks and 
challenges. Kenya has 614 Km. of coastline and 143,000 km2 of Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) (IHO- Kenya National Report to South African and Islands Hydrographic 
Commission (SAIHC), as well as a busy shipping lane and remote islands, as depicted 
in figure 1 below. According to the European Commission’s (EC) Joint Research 
Centre, “Surveillance is a key element to exercise national sovereignty at sea” (2008, 
EC Joint Research Centre). These sea areas require continuous surveillance and 
protection. 
Depending on the intended mission, 
maritime surveillance can be realized 
through a suite of reporting / messaging 
systems which either rely on vessels to 
provide own information or sensor 
systems which autonomously collect 
information about ships. The scope and 
mode of surveillance depends upon the 
domain of interest, ranging from 
environmental protection, fisheries 
protection, border control and territorial 
sovereignty. Ultimately, the primary aim is 
either to identify and deter infringement to 
regulations or to ensure safety and security. Africa’s coastline, measuring around 
30,500 km is confronted with a myriad of challenges. “The vastness of Africa’s 
maritime domain provides great opportunity for exploitation by terrorists. Terrorist 
Figure 1: Map of Kenya 
Source: Wikipedia 
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activities therefore constitute a latent threat….” (O.S Ibrahim, 2009). This complicates 
the maritime surveillance challenges, and calls for complete paradigm shift from the 
traditional approaches to more proactive and security-focused approach. 
Large portions of Kenya’s coastline are very remote and lack reliable communication 
infrastructure, mainly attributed to lack of connection to the national power grid. At the 
peak of the piracy menace off Somalia waters, numerous acts of piracy were staged 
on vessels destined to the port of Mombasa. Such sporadic attacks also targeted 
fishing boats and dhows, which were then used to further orchestrate the crime (use 
of mother boats). Between 2013 and 2015, virtually no successful acts of piracy were 
reported within waters of this region (IMB Piracy Reports on trends of piracy).  
However as recent reports show, piracy is still a huge regional challenge because 
underlying causes, such as illegal fishing and dumping in the Somalia piracy context 
remain unresolved. The economic cost of maritime piracy is on an upward trajectory, 
as Somali pirate networks resume attacks on ships. According to a recent report by 
“Oceans Beyond Piracy” Group, the cost attributable to piracy in Somalia increased 
to 1.7 Billion Dollars in 2016, from 1.3 Billion Dollars in 2015. This includes costs paid 
by shipping operators for increased insurance, labour, armed guards and other 
protection measures, as well as ransoms paid by insurers and the cost of naval 
deployments.  So far in 2017, there have been two high-profile hijackings by Somali 
pirates: The Aris Tanker in March and an Indian flagged commercial ship in April 
(Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2017) 
Although the combined intervention by Naval escort convoys and military action inside 
Somalia had appeared to ebb the tide of piracy between 2013 to late 2015, the recent 
resurgence is an indication that the pirate networks remain strategically poised and 
ready to attack commercial ships, at any slight opportunity. Dalaklis, 2012 analysed 
many of the important factors in the Somali piracy context, and concluded that piracy 
would only diminish when the rule of law is well established in the burdened country. 
A more effective and sustainable tool to keep vigilance and secure this sea area is 
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necessary, and focus seems to be gravitating towards Maritime Domain Awareness 
(MDA)1.  
The sea route bordering the State of Somalia and through the Horn of Africa, is very 
critical for global trade. International Maritime Organization (IMO), European Union 
(EU), United States of America (USA) and Regional Governments have made heavy 
investment in capacity building and technology transfer to make this sea area safe. 
Under the Global Search & Rescue (SAR) arrangements, Kenya has obligations 
relating to Search and Rescue coordination over an expansive portion of this sea area 
as well as 614 km of immediate territorial coastline dotted with a number of small 
remote islands. A thriving community of fishermen, with generally good understanding 
of local maritime environment and well-organized Beach Management Units (BMUs), 
dominates these remote islands. This fishing community can be engaged for proactive 
roles in maritime situational awareness. However, this capability can be impeded by 
lack of constructive engagement and poor state of communication infrastructure.  
According to a 2013 Watercraft and Baseline Survey Report by Kenya Maritime 
Authority (KMA) there are 206 fish landing sites along Kenya’s Indian Ocean 
Coastline, with a substantial number of these in private hands. Out of 16,805 surveyed 
watercrafts, 1894 were anchored and operated on privately owned sites. Given the 
remoteness of most of these regions, security ramifications can be severe. 
Therefore, analysis of the status of existing maritime surveillance forms the gist of this 
research undertaking. The immediate motivation is to establish the potential for 
renewable energy solutions in addressing communication gaps, hence improving 
maritime situational awareness in the areas. 
1.1 Research objectives 
Despite the compelling need for functional maritime surveillance systems to improve 
security situation in sea routes and archipelagic waters around Kenya’s Indian Ocean 
coastline, the challenges relating to power source have not come to a fruitful end. In 
seeking a solution, this thesis will: 
                                                             
1 MDA is the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that affects 
safety, the environment and economy. 
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a. Explore the viability of wind and solar power harvesting in these remote Islands 
for applications in maritime surveillance systems.  
b. Then assess how the identified, viable renewable energy options can be 
effectively used to power maritime surveillance equipment. 
c. Analyze the existing surveillance structure in the context of evolving maritime 
challenges in the region, and how renewable energy can deliver improvements. 
1.2 Research questions 
For an exhaustive investigation of the topic, answers to the following research 
questions are sought: 
a) Can renewable energy technologies be harnessed for application in maritime 
surveillance systems in Kenya’s remote Coastal Islands? 
b) Are there additional measures and facilities that can deliver improvements to 
Kenya’s overall Coastal Surveillance arrangements within the constraints of the 
maritime administration and civilian stakeholder agencies’ capabilities?  
Furthermore, an in-depth analysis of the current operational structure of maritime 
surveillance will lead to improved understanding of gaps that need to be 
addressed. In this context, the research questions are, 
c) What are the inherent risks of weak maritime surveillance in these remote coastal 
Islands? Based on case studies of successful implementations of maritime 
surveillance systems, how will the envisaged improvements to the maritime 
surveillance system enhance incident reporting and response capability in these 
areas?  
1.3 Research Methodology  
This thesis is compiled in the context of several academic studies, taking into account 
their insightful findings, recommendations and research methodologies. It involved 
the analysis of data and information from articles, books, journals, electronic sources, 
periodicals and reports. Costs and technical data relating to renewable energy 
technologies were sourced from government departments, renowned institutions, and 
organizations such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Renewable Energy 
Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21), the National renewable energy 
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laboratories (NREL), the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and the 
World Energy Council.  
Several company documents and expert references were also perused for data on 
the research topic. Information on the current vessel reporting systems and maritime 
surveillance arrangements was obtained from Kenya Maritime Authority and 
Mombasa Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (RMRCC).  Information on 
the international legal framework and maritime security reports was sourced from the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Baltic and International Maritime 
Council (BIMCO), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Shipping Centre, 
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and 
Oceans Beyond Piracy. 
A practical field survey covering the whole stretch of the Kenyan coastline is included. 
The physical survey was limited to obtaining GPS coordinates, area elevation above 
sea level and assessing accessibility. GPS data and area elevation are essential 
parameters for ascertaining conditions for effective Very High Frequency (VHF) 
triangulation. This thesis is organized in three thematic areas. The first part discusses 
renewable energy technologies, with a focus on the economic drivers surrounding 
renewable energy applications in maritime surveillance. The second part broadly 
examines maritime surveillance from the standpoint of facilities and arrangements at 
the disposal of the Maritime Authority and Civilian Agencies in Kenya. The third part 
analyses the current scenario and arrangements, and concludes with 
recommendations for the improvement of maritime surveillance. 
1.4 Thesis outline 
Chapter 1 contains a synopsis of this dissertation task, highlighting the nature of the 
problem, objectives of the study and the research scope. Chapter 2 is an extensive 
literature review of contemporary applications of renewable energy technologies and 
Kenya’s policy framework on renewable energy.  
Chapter 3 explores maritime surveillance and ship reporting systems, including AIS, 
VMS, LRIT and Coastal VHF coverage in Kenya. The Global SAR regime in the 
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context of national, regional and international obligations and arrangements are also 
examined.  
Chapter 4 discusses Kenya’s multi-agency approach to maritime surveillance, and 
civilian agencies’ input with respect to maritime safety and security. These are 
weighed in terms of their adequacy to the huge regional challenge of piracy and 
maritime crime. Reported maritime incidents are analysed to establish correlation 
between absence of robust maritime surveillance and the preponderance of incidents. 
The causal mechanisms approach is applied. 
Chapter 5 features a case study pertaining to the successful implementation of 
maritime surveillance. It examines how Papua New Guinea (PNG), with a coastline 
measuring 20,197 km and EEZ covering 3,120,000 km2, has successfully 
implemented a surveillance system fully powered from renewable energy sources. 
The chapter delves into the scope for improvement in Kenya’s surveillance 
arrangements, by juxtaposition to the PNG system. This is followed by a consolidation 
of the main outcomes and assumptions, into a coherent and focused roadmap for the 
overall improvement of maritime surveillance. Conclusions and recommendations 
drawn from the study are presented in this chapter. 
1.5 Delimitations.  
This dissertation explores the status of maritime surveillance in detached remote 
islands in light of the lingering challenges of maritime crime and piracy. It then 
examines how the application of renewable energy can be used to mitigate the 
challenges. It further analyses the regulatory framework to cope with maritime crime, 
including regional arrangements to improve situational awareness, in order to identify 
opportunities for improvement. The conclusions derived are construed to be 
specifically representative of Kenyan scenario. 
7 
 
2 CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
This chapter reviews some studies so far undertaken on renewable energy. The focus 
is on the economic considerations pertinent to planning and uptake of renewable 
energy for maritime surveillance applications in remote coastal islands. Generally, 
prospects for the application of renewable energy technologies across many facets of 
human endeavours appear bright. The Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st 
Century (REN21) reported in 2016 that 44 million off-grid pico-solar products had 
been sold globally by mid-2015, representing an annual market of 300 million US 
Dollars. There are huge prospects for maritime surveillance systems to tap into the 
fast expanding renewable energy sector. 
2.2 Renewable Energy 
Renewable energy is a concept that is fast capturing global attention. It has been 
variously described, as energy from a source that is not depleted when used, and 
according to “Dictionary.com”, it is “any naturally occurring, theoretically inexhaustible 
source of energy for instance biomass, solar, wind, tidal wave and hydro, that is not 
derived from fossil or nuclear fuel” (Dictionary.com) 
A more concise and encompassing definition is by Islam et al, (2014) which states 
that renewable sources are “those that are abundant in nature, and derived from 
natural processes with no depletion in the course of utilization” (Islam, Shahir, Uddin, 
& Saifullah, 2014). 
There is a vast collection of available literature on renewable energy. L.A Kristoferson 
and V. Bokalders, (2013) explored the renewable energy technologies, and 
demonstrated their growing prominence in developing countries. Dimakis et al. (2011) 
examined the various methods and tools to evaluate the potential and exploitable 
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energy sources. The approach emphasized attention to site-specific environmental 
aspects. 
Weisser (2004) analysed the dynamics of power generation in Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS) and extolled the unique characteristics in SIDS that make 
fossil fuel-based electricity generation  very costly. He emphasized the need for 
paradigm shift in energy planning. The conclusions of his study immensely lend 
themselves to the scenario under review in this thesis.  
Bergmann et al. (2006) evaluated external benefits and costs with respect to 
renewable energy investment. Although the study was based on the Scotland 
scenario, the conclusions on external costs and benefits to be considered for optimal 
investment in renewable energy options have universal applicability. Mondal et al. 
(2010) analysed the drivers, barriers and strategies for implementation of renewable 
energy technologies in rural areas in Bangladesh, through an innovative approach 
with immense applicability in developing regions with similar circumstances.  
2.3 Renewable Energy Potential 
To maximize the benefits obtainable from a renewable energy technology in a country, 
it is important to weigh the technology in the context of existing energy strategies and 
plans, financial, institutional as well as legal frameworks. J. P. Painuly, (2000) 
proposed three dimensions upon which to gauge potential: technological potential, 
techno-economic potential and economic potential. 
2.4 Costs and Trends in Renewable Energy uptake 
The aspect of cost and projections on its trend is a core decision attribute in renewable 
energy applications. In its 2017 outlook on renewable energy, the Frankfurt School 
(FS) – UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate Change and Sustainable Energy 
Finance projects that: “There were two main reasons for the fall in investment in 
renewables in 2016. One was lower costs, with average dollar capital expenditure per 
MW down by more than 10% for solar photovoltaics, onshore wind and offshore wind, 
improving the competitiveness of those technologies. The other was not so positive – 
there was a marked slowdown in financings in China, Japan and some emerging 
markets during the course of the year” (Frankfurt School (FS)-UNEP Collaborating 
Centre for Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Finance, 2017). 
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In a similar assessment, the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century 
(REN21) concluded that: “Rapid growth, particularly in the power sector, is driven by 
several factors, including the improving cost competitiveness of renewable energy 
technologies, dedicated policy initiatives, better access to financing, energy security 
and environmental concerns as well as growing demand for energy in the developing 
and emerging economies” (REN21, 2016).  
2.5 Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE)  
The World Energy Council defines LCOE as the price that has to be received per unit 
of output as payment for producing power, in order to reach a specified financial return 
or put simply “the price that a project must earn per megawatt hour in order to break 
even.” (World Energy Council, 2013).  
According to the Frankfurt School FS-UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate change 
and Sustainable Energy Finance, (2017) it is the “all-in one cost of generating each 
MWh of electricity from a power plant, including not only fuel used, but also the cost 
of project development, construction, financing, operation and maintenance”. 
(Frankfurt School FS-UNEP Collaborating Centre, 2017) 
Analytically, LCOE2 is denoted by: 
𝐿𝐶𝑂𝐸 =
Lifecycle Cost ( $)
2𝑎𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑘𝑊ℎ)
   … … … … … … 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 1                                       
LCOE Computation 
Based on National Renewable Energy Laboratories’ (NREL) Solar‐PV Manufacturing 
Cost Model, the Plant envelope incorporates the following elements 
 
 
                                                             
2 Equation 1: Levelised Cost of Energy 
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Table 1: LCOE Elements 
 Category Elements 
1 Infrastructure  Land acquisition 
Site preparation 
Installation of underground components 
Access roads 
Fencing 
Operations buildings and related 
maintenance 
2 Equipment Module supply 
Power electronics 
AC and DC components 
Installation. 
3 Electrical Infrastructure Transformers 
Switchgear 
Electrical Systems 
Connecting Modules. 
4 Financial Costs  Preliminary Feasibility & Engineering studies 
Environmental studies 
Permits 
Legal Fees 
Insurance costs 
Development Costs 
Property taxes during construction. 
 
.In this study, a Levelised Cost of Energy calculator was used to compare the LCOE 
cost of 17 technologies. The results and excel extract are included in appendix. For 
solar power the LCOE is US$ 85/MWh while for onshore wind, it is US$ 58/MWh. 
2.5.1 Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) and Operating Expenditure (OPEX) 
The World Energy Council defines CAPEX as the total cost of developing and 
constructing a plant, excluding any grid-connection charges. Feldman et al, (2015) 
and also Beamon and Leff, (2013), view CAPEX as representing the total expenditure 
required to achieve operation in a given year. On the other hand, OPEX is “the total 
annual operating expenditure from the first year of a project’s operation, given in per 
unit of installed capacity terms.” (World Energy Council, 2013). 
2.5.2 Capacity factor (Load Factor) 
The World Energy Council defines Capacity Factor as “the ratio of the net megawatt 
hours of electricity generated in a given year to the electricity that could have been 
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generated at continuous full-power operation, or 8,760 (per annum) full hours” (World 
Energy Council, 2013). 
2.5.3 Society’s Cost of Energy. 
This ascribes a much broader scope to the cost of energy, by taking into account 
factors such as the number of jobs created by energy source, subsidies, transmission 
costs, variability costs, geopolitical risk impact, besides also taking into account the 
Levelised Cost of Energy (LCOE). It was proposed by Siemens “to measure the true 
cost of electricity generated by various sources” (Siemens AG, 2014) 
2.5.4 Maritime Surveillance Systems powered by Solar and Wind: 
Several studies have been undertaken to establish the suitability of renewable energy 
for powering up surveillance systems in remote areas lacking connection to the 
national power grid. In 2011, the Border and Maritime Security Division (BMD) of the 
United States (US), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and National Renewable 
Energy Laboratories (NREL) conducted a joint study on border-security energy 
demands. The rationale of their study was to ensure that advances in renewable 
energy and energy storage would be reflected in improved security situation..  
They summarized the factors that make renewable energy particularly attractive for 
applications in maritime surveillance and border security, including the following: 
Operational continuity arising from grid failure. Installed renewable energy sources 
can sustain critical loads until grid service is restored. The greater the proportion of 
renewable energy technologies, the longer the operations can be sustained without 
grid power. 
Renewable energy technologies can reliably operate independent of the grid in 
remote locations, and often require very little maintenance. This can extend the 
capabilities in remote border-security operations. Also Some renewable energy 
technologies such as PV operate silently and require little maintenance. These 
characteristics make them very useful in locations where covert operations are 
necessary.  
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On the other hand, aging energy infrastructure poses a threat to national security. 
Electricity generated near the load reduces reliance on the grid infrastructure, thereby 
eliminating the operational burden relative to the grid infrastructure. Renewable 
energy offer strategic advantages by helping hedge against volatile fuel prices and 
supply interruptions, as well as reducing dependence on fossil fuels supplied from 
regions of conflict.  Renewable energy technologies are also clean, sustainable and 
mostly emission-free. 
To ascertain whether the power requirements of a given surveillance system can be 
met from renewable sources, it is necessary to establish the operational energy profile 
of the unit, in terms of peak power consumption, the duration of consumption (volts 
(V), amps (A), watts (W), phase, and whether it draws alternating current or direct 
current. It is also necessary to establish whether the unit is optimized for off-grid 
deployment, whether there is need for emergency backup and if so, the redundancy 
level necessary.  
2.5.5 Solar Energy 
Solar Energy can be processed either through Photovoltaic (PV) systems that directly 
convert the solar energy into electrical, or Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) systems 
which first convert the solar energy into thermal energy, then onwards to electrical 
engine through a thermal engine. 
There is a downward trend in the cost of solar systems worldwide. The International 
Renewable Energy Association (IRENA) has made a projection that reflects this 
downward trend, as depicted in figure 3 below. The plummeting cost of solar systems 
across the entire gamut of application areas justifies initiatives to explore usage in 
maritime surveillance systems. 
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Figure 2: Solar System Installed Cost: Worldwide Trend 
Source: IRENA, 2017 
Table 2 below provides a snapshot of typical efficiency figures for thin film and wafer 
technologies  in the category of Commercialized PVs.  
Table 2: Solar PV Technologies, 
 Source: NREL  
 PV technology Variation & Properties Efficiency 
1 Thin Film Lower cost per unit of power 
produced 
 
  Amorphous Silicon 7% 
  Cadmium Telluride 11%  
  Copper, Indium, Gallium, 
Selenide (CIGS) 
11%  
2 Wafer PV  Have greater efficiencies than 
thin film technologies 
14% to 20% 
3 Multi-junction PV Capture different spectra of 
light, thus increasing overall 
efficiency of the composite 
system. 
Up to 30% efficiency in 
systems that concentrate 
sunlight by up to 500 times  
2.5.6 Photovoltaics 
Based on assessment conducted by the National Renewable Energy Laboratories 
(NREL) of USA, PV panels do not have moving parts, and when combined with 
batteries they are very reliable. They also operate silently which accords a measure 
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of stealth. Some of the shortcomings cited with respect to photovoltaics include their 
requirements for additional equipment such as inverters to convert DC to AC, storage 
batteries for on-grid connections and the fact that land mounted PV panels require 
relatively large areas for deployment, thereby committing the land for 15 to 20 years 
or longer. PVs also feature relatively low efficiencies (between 14 to 25%) compared 
to other renewable energy technologies. PV panels are fragile and susceptible to easy 
damage, necessitating additional overheads on insurance costs. 
2.5.7 Wind 
According to the NREL, the economic viability of a wind project depends on the cost 
of the wind resource compared to that of electricity. A strong wind resource (Class 5 
and Class 6) can compete against electricity. A modest wind resource (Class 2 and 
Class 3) can compete against high-priced electricity. According to NREL, “the high 
cost of electricity in an environment where there is strong wind makes wind a 
compelling option with a short payback” (NREL, 2016)  
Over the past decade, wind energy has experienced annual growth rates in installed 
capacity of more than 30%. The wind industry has several distinct sectors, each 
characterized by specific technology and deployment strategies. Each of these wind 
sectors essentially envisage different technologies, assessment methods, 
economics, environmental considerations, and factors that serve as the drivers for 
those sectors. According to NREL, “There is no one design or size that is “the best in 
all applications”; rather, there are applications that favor certain sizes and designs, as 
they provide the better relative economics and performance within the application 
driven constraints” (NREL, 2016). 
2.5.8 Wind Power 
The amount of wind varies with the season, time of day, and weather events. The 
wind speed at any given time determines the amount of power available in the wind 
and subsequently the power that can be harnessed using a wind turbine generator. 
This power is given by: 
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 P = A Ρv3/2 
Where; 
P = power of the wind (watts) 
A = windswept area of the rotor (blades) = πD2/4 = π r2 [m2] (π r2 [10.76 ft2]) 
ρ = density of the air [kg/m3] (2.2 lb/3.28 ft3) (at sea level at 15°C) 
V = velocity of the wind [m/s] (3.28 ft./sec) 
Wind power (P) is proportional to velocity cubed (V3). If wind velocity is doubled, wind 
power increases by a factor of eight (23 = 8). Consequently, small differences in 
average speed cause significant differences in energy production. 
2.5.9 Hybrid Photovoltaic/ Wind Energy plus Battery System: 
Hybrid renewable energy projects involve the siting of different renewable energy 
projects within the same location: like solar and wind, or solar thermal and geothermal. 
The main attraction here includes the ease of distribution resulting from the sharing 
of one grid connection, production of more electricity per hectare of land, economy in 
operating and maintenance costs, and reduction of overall intermittency. “Mini grids 
are particularly viable in developing countries and on remote Islands especially with 
wind and solar or wave paired with batteries or even diesel back-up generators” 
(Frankfurt School (FS)-UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate Change and 
Sustainable Energy Finance, 2017)  
Various researchers have evaluated Hybrid Renewable Energy Systems (HRES) 
using different methods such as energy to load ratio, battery to load ratio, and non-
availability of energy. In order to select an optimal combination of a HRES to meet the 
demand, evaluation may be carried based on reliability and economics of power 
supply. 
According to the Frankfurt School (FS) – UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate 
Change and Sustainable Energy Finance, some 5.6GW of hybrid projects, each of 
more than 10MW have been constructed or are under various stages of development 
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worldwide. There is huge potential for this number to grow significantly in the years 
ahead, as developers take advantage of synergies from co-locating two or more 
technologies. 
2.6 Hybrid Optimization Model for Electric Renewables (HOMER) Software. 
HOMER renewable energy optimization software application, developed by the 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) in the United States, is helpful in 
designing and evaluating technical and financial variables for off-grid and on-grid 
power systems in remote, stand-alone and distributed generation applications. The 
software enables assessment of a large number of technology options to account for 
energy resource availability and other variables. 
Using the HOMER software a user can input an hourly power consumption profile and 
match renewable energy generation to the required load. Okedu et al, 2014 summed 
up the powerful tools unleashed by HOMER software: “it allows a  user to analyze 
micro-grid potential,  peak  renewables penetration,  ratio  of  renewable sources  to  
total  energy, and  grid  stability,  particularly  for medium  to  large  scale  projects.  
Additionally,  HOMER contains  a  powerful  optimizing  function  that  is  useful  in 
determining  the  cost  of  various  energy  project  scenarios” (Okedu & 
Uhunmwangho, 2014) 
The HOMER software simulates real technological scenarios in renewable energy, 
providing very detailed results for analysis. It enables the determination of possible 
combinations of technologies and sizes, hence powerful tools for optimization. On the 
flip side, its accuracy entirely depends on the quality of input data. In terms of the 
research topic under review, the HOMER software can provide convenient metrics for 
comparing between the various power generating technologies, without practically 
engaging the rigorous field research process. 
2.7 Renewable Energy technologies for Maritime Surveillance applications  
For purposes of this study, renewable energy options for maritime surveillance 
applications are analysed from two perspectives: applications involving off-grid wind/ 
solar power generation - requiring the construction of small off-grid power generating 
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systems. The second scope covers maritime surveillance equipment, primarily 
powered by solar, with wind as a standby source (similar to the system used by Papua 
New Guinea3 ) 
The assessment of prospects for stand-alone wind/ solar power generation in remote 
Islands of Kenya necessitates an analysis of the environment, the regulatory context 
of renewable energy generation in Kenya and cost aspects such as LCOE, CAPEX, 
OPEX and Capacity Factor. 
2.8 Energy situation in Kenya: 
According to Kenya’s Energy Regulatory Commission, Kenya’s energy mix consists 
of biomass (68%), hydrocarbons (22%), electricity (9%), solar and other forms of 
energy (1%), with petroleum and electricity dominating the commercial energy sector.   
“As at June 2015, Kenya had an installed electricity generation capacity of 2,299MW”  
(Energy Regulatory Commission Annual Report, 2016). This energy mix is depicted 
in figure 3 below, which projects the relative significance of each source in the 
country’s overall energy mix. 
  
Figure 3: Kenya's Energy mix 
                                                             
3 Papua New Guinea Maritime Surveillance System is analysed in chapter 5 
Energy Type %
Biomass
Hydrocarbons
Electricity
Solar & Others
Total Electricity generated 
2299 MW
Hydro
Thermal
Geothermal
Wind
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2.8.1 Management of the Energy Sector in Kenya 
Several Government bodies are responsible for management of the energy sector in 
Kenya. These are listed in table 3 below. Overall operation and administration of the 
sector is under the remit of the Ministry of Energy & Petroleum. 
Table 3: Government Bodies responsible for Energy Management in Kenya 
Government Bodies 
 
 Body Mandate 
 
1. Ministry of Energy 
and Petroleum 
 Provides policy direction and prepares the least cost energy 
development plan for the whole country. 
 Operates four Directorates, reflecting the various forms of energy 
sources. These are Electric Power, Renewable Energy, 
Geothermal, Oil and Petroleum. 
 
2. Energy Regulatory 
Commission, (ERC) 
 Established through the energy Act 2006- provides technical, 
economic and regulatory oversight on the energy sector in Kenya. 
 
3.  Rural Electrification 
Authority (REA), 
 Incorporated in 2007- has the mission to implement rural 
electrification program. 
 
4. The Energy Tribunal  Has responsibility for arbitration between the Energy Regulatory 
Commission (ERC) and aggrieved stakeholders in the energy 
sector. 
 
Electricity (Power) generating companies 
 
1. Kenya Generating 
Company (KenGen) 
 Generates 76% of the total country output, equivalent to 1238 MW. 
It is government owned. 
2. Independent Power 
Producers (IPPs) 
 Generate 24% of the total energy produced, equivalent to 391 MW. 
Distribution 
 
1. Kenya Power & 
Lighting Company 
(KPLCo) 
 
 Distribution of electricity to end users/ retailing. 
2. Kenya Electricity 
Transmission 
Company 
(KETRACO) 
 
 Incorporated in 2008- is responsible for planning, designing, 
constructing, owning, operating and maintaining new high voltage 
(>132 KV) transmission grid and regional interconnections. 
3. Geothermal 
Development 
Company (GDC) 
 Responsible for surface exploration of geothermal fields, 
exploration, appraisals, drilling, steam production and negotiating 
steam sales agreements with investors in the geothermal electricity 
generation subsector. 
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2.8.2 The National Regulatory Framework on Renewable  
Energy Regulations in Kenya are anchored in Sessional Paper No: 4 of 2004,the 
Energy Act of 2006,  Energy Policy of 2004, which lays the foundation for the current 
energy policy and the Feed-in Tariffs policy of 2008 (Revised in 2012), which together  
encourage electricity generation through renewable sources. A key pillar with regard 
to renewable energy is the Feed-in Tariff policy (FiT) initiated in 2008, which provides 
investment security and market stability for investors while motivating private 
investors towards renewable energy 
technology. 
The National Climate Change Response 
Strategy enacted in 2014 aims to strengthen 
and focus nationwide actions towards 
climate change adaptation and GHG 
emission mitigation. Another important 
feature is the zero-rating of import duty and 
removal of Value Added Tax (VAT) on 
renewable energy equipment and 
accessories.   
2.8.3 Kenya Electricity Grid Network: 
The national grid network in Kenya comprises over 30400 km of both transmission 
and distribution lines, made up of some 1323 km of 220 kV lines, 3767 km of 132 kV 
and 630 km of 66 kV lines. Figure 4 below depicts the transmission network (Solar & 
Wind Resource Assessment- Kenya) 
According to a study report dubbed “Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP) 
Joint Development Partner Scoping Mission, February 7-11, 2011”,: “inadequate 
power supply and weak electricity network infrastructure is a brake on Kenya’s 
economic performance and threatens Kenya’s ambition set out in its overarching 
development program (Vision 2030) to be a middle-income country by 2030” 
Figure 4: Electricity Grid Network in Kenya 
Source: Kenya Power & Lighting 
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(Government of Kenya, 2011). This provides further impetus to the need to consider 
self-sustainable off-grid sources for critical infrastructure. 
 
2.8.4 Renewable Energy potential in Kenya: 
In its 2002 Kenya Country Report, the Solar and Wind Resource Assessment 
(SWERA) projected that about 25% of the country was compatible with current wind 
technology. Along the coast, the wind resource varies between 5-7 m/s at 50 metres 
height. This finding reflects the fact that Kenya, generally, and her coastal region in 
particular, is endowed with adequate wind resources  
Studies by the Solar and Wind Energy Resource Assessment (SWERA) on solar 
energy resource potential in Kenya established Kenya  received an average solar 
radiation equal to 4.5 kWh per square meter per day.” (Kenya Country Report Solar 
and Wind Energy Resource Assessment, 2008).
  
21 
 
3 CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
3.0 Maritime Surveillance 
Maritime surveillance involves the application of various tools and techniques to 
monitor a state’s territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Dalaklis, 2016 
viewed maritime surveillance from two perspectives: 
NATO perspective: Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) is “the understanding of 
military and non-military events, activities and circumstances within and associated 
with the maritime environment that are relevant for current and future NATO 
operations and exercises -where the Maritime Environment (ME) is the oceans, seas, 
bays, estuaries, waterways, coastal regions and ports” (Dalaklis, 2016) 
IMO perspective: Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is “the effective understanding 
of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, 
economy, or environment”. In the later definition, the maritime domain includes all 
areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, 
or other navigable waterway, including all maritime related activities, infrastructure, 
people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances”  (Dalaklis, 2016) 
3.1 Legal basis for Maritime Surveillance: 
Two pertinent elements of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
underpin maritime surveillance: the provisions on Maritime Zoning and the notion of 
the nationality of ship. Pursuant to UNCLOS (Articles 24 & 25), a Coastal State has 
the exclusive right to undertake monitoring and surveillance within its territory 
including its territorial sea, which, may extend up to 12 nautical miles (nm) from the 
‘baseline’. Figure 5 below depicts the maritime zones. A state’s sovereign rights vary, 
across the maritime zones. 
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Figure 5: Maritime Jurisdictions 
As provided for in UNCLOS, a Coastal State has exclusive rights to undertake 
monitoring and surveillance in connection with economic exploitation and exploration 
of its EEZ. Further, all States have the implied right to undertake monitoring and 
surveillance in the high seas, subject to not interfering with the exercise of the freedom 
of the high seas by ships flying a foreign flag. Search and Rescue (SAR) regions, with 
purely functional purpose and no correlation with maritime zones claimed pursuant to 
UNCLOS, constitute an important basis for maritime surveillance. 
3.2 IMO instruments pertaining to the safety of shipping 
Dalaklis, 2016 summarized IMO’s global shipping regulatory framework from legal, 
trade, environmental and safety perspectives. The various enshrining conventions are 
depicted in figure 6 below. 
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Figure 6: IMO Conventions 
Courtesy: Dalaklis, 2016 
 
In the context of this study, the SAR Convention and the SOLAS Conventions embody 
the international regulations that underpin maritime surveillance. SOLAS Convention 
covers equipment specification, while the SAR Convention lays down the operational 
framework for maritime surveillance. In Kenya, IMO Conventions are enshrined in the 
Merchant Shipping Act, 2009, following domestication of the IMO Statutes by Kenya.  
 
 
IMO 
   
   Legal 
Environ
mental 
protectio
Safety 
Trade 
LOS – Law of the Sea Convention (1982)  
 
PAL – The convention relating to the 
carriage of Passengers and their Luggage 
by Sea (1974) 
 
SUA – Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the safety of 
maritime navigation (1988) 
SAR – Convention on Maritime Search and 
Rescue (1979) 
 
 LL – The Load line Convention (1966)  
 
CSC – The Convention for Safe Containers 
(1972) 
SOLAS – The Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea (1974) 
 STCW – The Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watch keeping  
(1978)  
COLREG – The Convention on the Prevention 
of Collision at Sea  (1972) 
 INMARSAT – The Convention on the 
International Maritime Satellite Organisation 
(1976) 
MARPOL – The 
Convention on the 
Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships (1973/78) 
 
 SALVAGE – The 
International Salvage 
Convention (1989)  
 
OPRC – The Convention 
on Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Cooperation 
(1990) 
 
FAL – The Convention on 
the Facilitation of 
Maritime Traffic (1965)  
TONNAGE – The 
Convention on the 
Tonnage Measurement of 
Ships (1969) 
INTERVENTION – convention relating to 
intervention on the high seas in cases of Oil 
Pollution Casualties (1969) 
 
 CLC – Convention in Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage (1969)  
 
IOPC - Convention on the establishment of an 
International Compensation Fund for Oil 
Pollution Damage (1971, 1992)  
 
LLMS – Convention on the Limitation of 
Liability for Maritime Claims (1976) 
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3.3 Surveillance systems 
Surveillance systems include visual sightings, still cameras, closed circuit television 
(CCTV), radar and infrared imaging. Such systems and techniques are pivotal in the 
construction of a maritime picture in situations where either data is not provided under 
a reporting regime (whether deliberately or not), in respect of (typically smaller) 
vessels that are not subject to a reporting regime.  
3.3.1 Military surveillance systems 
Gathering of surveillance data is an integral component of the roles undertaken by 
navies for defense purposes. This came in the aftermath of the International Ship & 
Port Security (ISPS) Code - primarily designed to deter terrorism. Ascertaining precise 
amount and scope of data within the purview of military surveillance is not easy, owing 
to the confidentiality that surrounds this. Nonetheless, standard modes of gathering 
such data include physical observation from military vessels and aircraft, unmanned 
vehicles and drones, remote sensing, coastal radars, and underwater sensors. 
Military surveillance systems are characterized by their robustness and rigorous 
energy requirements.  
3.3.2 Commercial Surveillance and Ship reporting systems 
These feature less stringent requirements in terms of robustness and energy 
consumption, but are applied to fulfil specific monitoring or surveillance needs. Ship 
reporting systems include LRIT (Long Range Identification and Tracking) as 
mandated by IMO via SOLAS chapter V, Regulation 19-1 in 2008, AIS (Automatic 
Identification System) by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) vide: ITU-
M 1371, 2014 (Rev) and Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) for fishing vessels, 
mandated by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) - 1998, plus non‐automatic 
reporting through transceiver radio call‐in.  
Despite differences in architectural design, all these systems enable the automatic 
transmission of ships’ identity and position, sometimes with additional information. 
“For many applications, there is a requirement to have an up‐to‐date awareness of 
where, within a certain area of interest, all the ships are, who they are, and where 
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they are going: i.e. to know the Maritime Situational Picture” (Greidanus, et al., 2013). 
This requirement is consistent with obligations pertaining to maritime safety and 
security.  
Popa, (2011), analysed the success of LRIT in addressing the challenge of piracy, 
while Chen, (2014) made a comprehensive comparison between LRIT and Satellite –
based AIS in terms of costs, communications scheme, coverage, information scope 
and credibility and emphasized the complementary roles delivered when both 
systems are operated concurrently.  
Ship reporting systems are provided for in Regulation 11, Chapter V of SOLAS. 
Several ship-reporting regimes are incidental within European waters. These include 
mandatory systems that apply to specific stretches of water, general obligations to 
notify the Ports of destination, and reporting regulations under Vessel Traffic Services 
(VTS). 
3.3.3 Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
Based on Regulation 19 of Chapter V of the International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS), AIS is mandatory for all vessels of 300 GRT and above on 
international voyages, cargo ships of over 500 Gross Registered Tons (GRT), and 
passenger vessels irrespective of size. Warships and government owned vessels are 
exempted.  
AIS enables exchange of data between ships as well as coastal stations, including 
the unique Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) of the vessels, Call Sign and 
Name, IMO Number and details of the ship, automatically generated dynamic 
navigational data and details of the ship’s position, course and speed over ground 
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and navigational status, plus manually entered static data. The messages are 
transmitted un-encrypted over open frequencies (161.975 MHz & 162.025 MHz for 
terrestrial communications and 156.775 MHz & 156.825 MHz for satellite 
communications) (ITU-R, 2012) hence allowing everyone with suitable equipment to 
receive it. AIS reduces the workload for authorities tasked with monitoring and 
controlling coastal and offshore vessels calling at Ports. The slot mapping architecture 
of the AIS system is based on Self Organized Time Division Multiple Access 
(SOTDMA), depicted in figure 7 above. 
 
 
3.3.4 Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) 
LRIT is a collection and distribution system for basic information on vessels. Following 
IMO’s adoption of amendments to SOLAS chapter V, Regulation 19-1 in 2008, LRIT 
regulations apply to the following ships engaged on international voyages: all 
passenger ships including high speed craft, cargo ships, including high speed craft, 
of more than 300 GRT, and mobile offshore drilling units. These categories of vessels 
are required to automatically transmit their identity, position, and time at six hourly 
intervals, with the ability to increase this rate to once every fifteen minutes when 
requested while on international voyages.  
Figure 7: AIS System slot mapping architecture,  
Source: US Coastguard (USCG) 
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SOLAS Contracting Governments bear operating costs of the system. The system 
allows member States to receive position reports from vessels operating under their 
flag, vessels seeking entry to a port within their territory, and vessels operating in 
proximity to a Member State’s coastline (up to within 1000 nm). Besides enhancing 
security and environmental protection, LRIT offers safety/search-and-rescue benefits. 
The system architecture is depicted in figure 8 below. 
 
Figure 8: LRIT System architecture, 
Source: International Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO) 
 
3.3.5 Very High Frequency (VHF) Digital Selective Calling (DSC) 
The DSC system provides facilities for calling individual stations, stations in a 
specified geographical area or all stations within the radio coverage of the calling 
station. DSC may be used for distress calls, safety calls and routine calls and may be 
used between ships or between ship and shore. A DSC call contains information on 
category of call, identification of the caller, nature of distress, position and type of 
subsequent communications. One unique feature with DSC is the prioritization facility, 
which enhances the reliability of the radio communication. DSC is a time synchronous 
system using 10-unit error detecting code and error correcting transmissions.  In 
radiotelephony, VHF channel 70 (156,525 MHz) is allocated to DSC only at a data 
speed of 1200 Baud.  
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3.3.6 Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS) 
The Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS) is an unclassified, 
near real-time AIS data collection and distribution network. It promotes collaboration 
and data sharing among international participants, with the primary goal of increasing 
maritime security and safety. Data sources may range from a single sensor to an 
entire national vessel-tracking network. MSSIS enables password-protected, Internet-
based sharing of AIS data using encrypted data links.  
The client software for MSSIS runs on Trans view (TV32), providing a common 
system interface and vessel tracking display for users. Apart from a suite of 
standalone display features, it also serves as a platform for users to access and 
contribute to the aggregated, global data.  
3.3.7 Automated Mutual Assistance Vessel Rescue System (AMVER) 
AMVER is a worldwide voluntary vessel reporting system operated by the US 
Coastguard to promote safety of life at sea. Mooted in the wake of the Titanic disaster 
in 1912, AMVER’s main contribution is to quickly provide Search and Rescue 
Authorities with accurate information on the positions and characteristics of vessels 
near a reported distress. Request for AMVER assistance with respect to a vessel in 
Figure 9: MSSIS Display at Mombasa RMRCC, 
Source: RMRCC Mombasa. 
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distress is sent to the US Coast Guard. The request should specify position, vessel’s 
details, the center and radius, and request for SURPIC (surface picture). The US 
Coastguard promptly faxes back the result, with a rich amount of detail regarding 
ships within vicinity of the distressed craft from whom assistance may then be 
promptly sought, in tandem with GMDSS distress response procedures. 
3.3.8 Vessel Monitoring System (VMS): 
Vessel monitoring systems help fisheries administrations to monitor vessel position, 
course and speed, with a view to ensuring fishing vessels are doing the right thing. It 
is one of the most widespread cooperative surveillance tools currently used for 
fisheries management. A VMS system incorporates a transceiver unit that transmits 
its GPS coordinates via a communications satellite to a monitoring station ashore. 
Currently VMS uses satellite GPS technology that provides position data within 10 m 
resolution globally. While there are currently no binding global agreements regarding 
the use of VMS, most Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) as 
well as many States have mandated its use on larger commercial fishing vessels. 
3.3.9 Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) 
These are shore based-systems founded on Regulation 12 of SOLAS, supplemented 
by guidelines adopted pursuant to IMO Resolution A.857 (20) of November 1997. Port 
VTS is primarily concerned with traffic management in and around ports while Coastal 
VTS deals with ship traffic through a specific area. Upon entering a VTS area, the 
master of a ship is under obligation to report to the authority responsible for the VTS, 
and then monitor a specific radio frequency for navigational or other warnings. The 
activities of a ship within a VTS area are also monitored via radar, AIS, remote video 
cameras, and in some cases radio direction finders (RDF). 
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4.0 Management of Kenyan waters. 
Management of Kenyan waters is a shared responsibility among several Government 
Agencies, with Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA) having the lead role in regulatory 
aspects. KMA collaborates with several government bodies like the Kenya Ports 
Authority (KPA), Ministry of Fisheries, Kenya Maritime Police Unit, Kenya Ferry 
Services Ltd, Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS) and Kenya Navy among others.  
Maritime policies provide a framework that guides the growth of the sector while 
ensuring compliance with international and institutionalized approach to maritime 
issues. Each Agency’s mandate is stipulated in their respective enabling Acts.  
KWS’ main role involves protection and conservation of the marine environment in 
the five gazetted national marine parks and reserves through the Wildlife 
Conservation and Management (Amendment) Act, 1989. The Kenya Navy mans and 
patrols the EEZ against external aggression and illegal activities besides offering 
support in search and rescue operations for persons in distress at sea. The Kenya 
Maritime Police unit patrols the territorial waters, and supports search and rescue 
activities at sea. The Unit was established in April 2007 as a law enforcement agency 
to deal with maritime activities to provide security along the seas and lakes in Kenya. 
4.1 The Institutional framework for Maritime Safety & Security in Kenya. 
This is based on a multi-agency approach, achieved through collaboration between 
several Government agencies with mandates that cut across the maritime spectrum 
as follows: 
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Lead Government Agency 
 
Maritime Security component 
 
Kenya Maritime Authority  Maritime Search & Rescue and Pollution 
control 
Kenya Navy  Patrolling / securing Kenya’s EEZ 
Kenya Ports Authority  VTMS and Mombasa port compliance with 
ISPS code 
Kenya Wildlife Services  Preservation of marine environment/ Law 
enforcement capabilities. 
Kenya Maritime Police Unit  Patrolling territorial waters/ Law enforcement 
Kenya Revenue Authority  Border control/ Prevention of contraband goods 
Kenya Fisheries  Prevention of illegal fishing activities 
Immigration Department  Border control & prevention of illegal 
immigrants 
Criminal Investigations Department   Investigations/ prosecution 
National Security Intelligence Services   Gathering of intelligence related to piracy/ 
terrorism. 
4.2 The regulation of watercraft in Kenya. 
The existing regulatory framework incorporates rules and guidelines for safety, 
security and protection of the environment and registration, certification, licensing and 
authorization documents, which govern the management of the maritime sector. The 
enshrining documents include: 
1. The Merchant Shipping Act 2009, (Revised 2012) 
2. The Kenya Maritime Authority Act 2006 – Cap No. 5 of 2006,  
3. The Fisheries Act, 1989 –Cap 378 - August 1989 
4. The Fisheries (Beach Management Unit) Regulations, 2007 
5. The Ports Authority Act, 1987-Cap 391 - January 1978 
6. The Ferries Act-Cap 410, October 1936 
7. The Wildlife (Conservation and Management (Amendment) Act, 1989-No.16 
of 1989. 
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8. Lakes and Rivers Act-Cap 409, December 1930 
4.3 Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA) 
Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA) was incorporated in June 2004 as a semi-
autonomous agency with regulatory oversight over the Kenyan maritime industry. It 
operates under the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, with head office in the 
coastal city of Mombasa. Pollution control, Port and Flag State Control are among 
core functions of KMA (KMA Act, 2006). The Authority bears overall responsibility for 
the enhancement of Kenya’s regulatory and institutional capacities for maritime safety 
and security, effective implementation of international maritime conventions and other 
mandatory instruments relating to maritime safety and security. It is also responsible 
for the promotion of maritime training, coordination of Search and Rescue, prevention 
of marine pollution and promoting preservation of the marine environment besides 
generating an enabling environment for trade and maritime investment. These 
responsibilities are anchored in the Merchant Shipping Act, 2009 (amended in 2012). 
KMA has the mission to strengthen maritime administration in Kenya. 
4.3.1 Mombasa Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (RMRCC) 
Mombasa RMRCC was established following the Florence Conference 2000, which 
set up a Search and Rescue (SAR) Global Fund and recommended the establishment 
of five Regional SAR Centres to cover sea areas adjacent to the African continent 
(IMO, 2006). It was commissioned by the IMO Secretary General on 5th May, 2006, 
in the implementation phase of the Florence 2000 recommendations, and became the 
first Regional Centre in Africa to be so established. The three Sub-Centres that 
operate under Mombasa RMRCC are Dar es Salaam, Seychelles, and Somalia 
Search region, which still has no GMDSS/ SAR infrastructure in place. 
This Centre is the designated focal point for Kenya on all aspects related to maritime 
safety information, with coverage extending from Kenya’s territorial waters to the 
expansive East Africa Search and Rescue Region. All maritime distress alerts 
activated within the region are routed to the Mombasa RMRCC. For incident reporting, 
vessels have to originate transmissions to the center. 
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4.3.2 Operational roles of RMRCC Mombasa. 
The Centre was commissioned as the Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre 
(RMRCC) for the East Coast of Africa in May 2006. On 31st March, 2011 the Centre 
took up additional roles as a Piracy Information Sharing Centre (ISC) within the 
framework of Regional anti-piracy grouping (Djibouti Code of Conduct).  
Other delegated functions include collecting data on, and tracking vessels calling at 
the Port of Mombasa, receiving and maintaining a database on Kenyan registered/ 
owned dhows and their areas of operation as a strategy for enhancing Maritime 
Domain Awareness. Mombasa RMRCC maintains a 24/7 GMDSS watch and is fitted 
with a number of both Satellite and Terrestrial GMDSS and emergency 
communication facilities. The MMSI number of the Centre is 00 634 1000. The table 
below is a summary of equipment and cost data relative to the operation of the various 
systems and facilities from the RMRCC in Mombasa.  
Figure 10: RMRCC Mombasa SRR,  
Source: RMRCC Mombasa. 
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 System Connection 
Platform 
Primary 
function 
Area of 
applicability 
Cost 
Implication to 
the Centre 
(US$) 
1. LRIT Internet Vessel tracking 1000 NM and 
global for flag 
vessels 
Annual fixed 
cost @ 1,200 
USD. 
Tracking 
expenses 
charged per 
vessels 
tracked. 
2. AIS  Vessel tracking 30 – 40 NM 
within port 
vicinity 
Quarterly 
maintenance 
3. Electronic 
Chart  
(C-Map) 
Internet Vessel location 
and Distance 
estimation 
Worldwide Regular 
software 
updates 
4. 111 Toll 
free line 
GSM Network Incident 
reporting by 
non-SOLAS 
vessels & fishing 
boats. 
Territorial 
waters, 
subject to 
GSM network 
coverage. 
Monthly ISDN 
standing 
charges @ 
300 USD. 
Billing also 
done as per 
usage. 
5. GMDSS 
Console 
Radio 
communications 
& Satellite 
Alerting function  
and 
communication  
with vessels in 
distress 
Sea Areas A1 
to A4 
 
Annual 
maintenance 
of equipment 
6 Mercury 
System 
Secure Internet Real time 
tracking and 
anti-piracy 
messaging and 
chats. 
Closed system 
- Restricted to 
authorized 
entities. 
Nil. 
7. MSSIS 
Sea Vision 
Satellite AIS 
delivered via 
Internet 
Locating vessels 
of interest and 
safety related 
vessel tracking. 
Global Nil 
8. ISC VOIP 
Facility 
Internet Voice 
communication 
with other ISCs 
and National 
Focal Points on 
Piracy. 
Djibouti Code 
of Conduct 
Partner States 
and National 
Focal Points. 
Nil. 
 
     
Figure 11: Communication facilities at RMRCC Mombasa 
Source: RMRCC Mombasa. 
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4.4 Discussion of the various systems and arrangements 
The consolidated effect of the various facilities, arrangements, regulations and 
agreements give effect to Maritime Domain Awareness. Weaknesses in the various 
systems and arrangements are reviewed below. 
The LRIT system obligates SOLAS Contracting Governments to bear operating costs 
of the system. The high cost of tracking vessels does not favour small flag states and 
tracking is only possible when the ship borne transmitter equipment is switched on. 
Vessel position reports are made available to other Member States for purchase, 
whenever a vessel is within 1000 nautical miles of the purchasing coast, or when a 
vessel seeking entry to a Member State’s port is at a pre-determined distance or time 
period from that port. When the LRIT system in Mombasa is activated on the 1000NM 
polygon, vessels as far away as the Gulf of Aden are tracked. This is depicted in the 
figure below. 
 
Figure 12: RMRCC Mombasa, LRIT 1000 NM Polygon activation,  
Source: RMRCC Mombasa 
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The AIS System is primarily a collision avoidance system with a protocol that involves 
a simple and easily manipulated exchange of electronic data via unsecured 
connections. While vessels are obligated to transmit their position through the AIS, 
there is no system to validate whether the information transmitted is accurate 
(Windward Assessment Report, 2014). There are a number of loopholes in the 
system, which can be used to manipulate real world AIS/ Satellite data, including: 
neglecting to transmit a vessel’s final destination, shutting AIS transmissions, creating 
‘Ghost ships’ and manipulating the GPS information.  
Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS): Due to its status as a cooperative system, VMS 
does not help much with IUU fishing and does not monitor non‐participating vessels. 
Vessels can also evade VMS regulations by registering with states which do not 
require its use, are not members of RFMOs that require its use, or which require VMS 
use but lack the will or capacity to enforce regulations. Vessels may also tamper with 
their VMS and disable the equipment, jam signals, or broadcast false position data. 
Kenya has not yet operationalized VMS as a fisheries vessel-monitoring tool. 
4.5 Maritime Surveillance challenges. 
Wambua, 2010, examined the nature and severity of these challenges. In his 
assessment: “IUU fishing and maritime security issues stand out as the two main 
challenges that have had the greatest impact on the African nations and on the entire 
maritime world” (Wambua, 2010). The main challenges facing African states in their 
quest to bring order and sound governance to their maritime zones are summarized 
below: 
1. Challenges pertaining to the delimitation of the maritime zones  
2. Weak legal and institutional frameworks for governance of the maritime 
zones  
3. Lackluster focus on training facilities and institutions to develop a pool of 
competent human resources for the governance process  
4. Funding challenges for the exploration of and research on marine resources 
5. Threat of marine pollution from land-based and ship-based sources 
6. IUU fishing from foreign vessels and trawlers 
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7. Piracy, armed attack against ships and hostage taking  
8. Inadequate preparedness to deal with maritime Search and Rescue  
9. Illegal immigration  
10. Drug trafficking  
11. Smuggling and contraband goods and arms  
12. Inadequate port security  
 
B. Hamand, 2016 conducted a study on maritime terrorism (why East Africa 
community is the next potential target of maritime terrorism) and observed that the 
terrorist activities in the East African Community (EAC) have so far been staged on 
land, and mainly in Kenya. The study concluded that “lack of a regional maritime 
security strategy (including a Maritime Domain Awareness program), unpoliced 
maritime waters and poor cooperation between Kenyan and Tanzanian maritime law 
enforcement agencies makes the region extremely vulnerable to maritime terrorism” 
(Hamand, 2017) 
4.6 Maritime surveillance challenges in remote Islands:  Causal Mechanisms  
The Kenyan coastline extends for 614 km, stretching along four administrative 
Counties: Lamu, Malindi, Mombasa and Kwale and supports approximately 9,000 
fishermen, directly through fisheries. According to the Kenya Marine Fisheries 
Research Institute (KMFRI) Kenya’s EEZ, measuring some 143,000 km2 is located 
within the rich Tuna belt in the South Western Indian Ocean. Statistics gathered by 
the MRCC in Mombasa indicate that most of maritime incidents reported in Kenyan 
waters happen very close to the shore and in the Inland lakes and affect small vessels 
ferrying passengers and fishing community. These vessels are generally ill equipped 
with lifesaving and emergency communication facilities, but provide a source of 
livelihood for a significant proportion of the nation’s maritime community. 
Crime statistics recorded along the Kenyan Coastline by the Kenya Maritime Police 
Unit (KMPU) indicate that there is risk of infiltration of small arms, drug trafficking, 
influx of refugees, threats of terrorism, piracy, illegal fishing and trawling, and 
contraband activities among many other crimes. (KMPU, 2016) 
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4.6.1 Lamu Island. 
Several studies have been reviewed to project a comprehensive overview of the 
current issues at hand. “Lamu district, which includes a very unique island 
archipelago, is an area of huge marine potential with a vast amount of underutilized 
assets” (Heddon & Lali, 2006). Lamu Old Town has the status of UNESCO Cultural 
Centre (inscribed in 2001), “as the oldest and best preserved Swahili settlement in 
East Africa (UNESCO, 2001).  
Lamu County extends from the Somali border to about 2° 22’S encompassing the 
entire Lamu archipelago which consists of several islands, fishing villages and hubs. 
According to the Kenya Marine Fisheries Research Institute (KMFRI), fishing is a 
major  economic activity in the area, sustaining 70 % to 75 % of the residents either 
directly or Indirectly. The fishing tradition in Lamu dates back to more than 1,200 
years. Lamu people are famous for their skills in fish production, boat building, sailing 
and other marine activities, which has culminated into a vast seafaring and a thriving 
mercantile society. Fishing, being mainly artisanal and subsistent in nature, is 
undertaken mostly from small, non-motorized boats such as outriggers, dhows and 
planked pirogues. Due to conspicuous challenges in fishing craft technology, fishing 
effort is mainly exercised within the reef areas and hardly extends beyond Kenya’s 
territorial waters. Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing is phenomenal in 
these areas.  
Figure 13: Lamu Island 
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4.7 The Piracy challenge.  
The subject of Somali piracy has engaged the global maritime community for a long 
time since it first appeared during the second phase of the Somali Civil War in the 21st 
Century. Actions that embody crime of piracy are defined in the United Nations Laws 
of the sea (UNCLOS) Article 101. IMO Resolution A.1025 (26) defines “Armed robbery 
against ships, while the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) Convention lays down 
the legal framework for the prosecution of acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (1988).The analysis of Somali piracy is relevant because of the impact it 
generates in relation to maritime surveillance strategies as well as its adverse effect 
on commercial vessels destined to the port of Mombasa. During the worst period of 
piracy, vessels tended to transit far away from the Somalia coastline, with enormous 
repercussions to the economies of the region. 
The AIS density map in figure 14 depicts the effect of piracy- at the peak of the 
menace. The diversion of ship traffic to avoid the Somalia Coastline meant longer 
shipment routes, adding approximately 3500 NM for southbound transit through the 
Horn of Africa (HOA). Immediate repercussion included: increased insurance 
premiums by shipping lines, reduction of ship traffic as vessels reroute, delays in the 
delivery of goods, with costs passed down the supply chain to end-users, decline in 
revenue from tourism following increased perception of insecurity including the 
“potential use of proceeds from piracy/ ransom to finance terrorism” (Interpol, 2012). 
Maritime piracy (The Somali context) 
was on the steady rise between early 
2009 to late 2012. From 2013, there has 
been a reversal. According to European 
Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR), 
intensified naval operations had by 2012 
led to a drastic drop in successful pirate 
attacks (EU NAVFOR, 2013).  
According to the International Chamber 
of Shipping this decrease has been due Figure 14: AIS density map 
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to “the combined success of self-protective measures taken by shipping companies 
including adoption of Best Management Practices (BMP4), continued use of privately 
contracted armed security on board ships, and military assets in the region” 
(International Chamber of Shipping, 2017). But despite this hiatus, the root causes of 
the problem remain largely unresolved (illegal fishing and smuggling).  
A study conducted by Ghassan Schbley and William Rosenau into Piracy, Illegal 
Fishing, and Maritime Insecurity in Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania in 2013 concluded 
that:” As the number of piracy incidents has dropped, other transnational threats have 
emerged. The maritime sector—including commercial vessels, fishing boats, and 
small artisanal craft, such as dhows—enables drug traffickers, arms dealers, and 
those engaged in human smuggling and trafficking to travel almost undetected up and 
down the coastlines of Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania. Some of these illegal activities 
are conducted for purely criminal reasons. However, there is evidence of ties between 
criminal actors and terrorists associated with al-Qaeda’s affiliates in Africa” (Schbley 
& Rosenau, 2013) 
Official list by Somalia Government of 40 apprehended suspects noted that 80% were 
born in Somalia’s southern conflict zones, while only 20% came from more stable 
regions. According to a BBC assessment report (published in 2008), pirates can be 
ranked in three categories: Local fishermen – considered the brain of the pirates’ 
operation because of their skills and knowledge of the sea, Ex-militiamen who 
previously fought for the local clan warlords or ex-military from the former Barre 
Government and Technical experts – who operate equipment such as GPS devices. 
Their illegal activities have tended to escalate southwards, towards the maritime 
boundary with Kenya. Because of the proximity and ease of access to the Islands 
constituting the Lamu archipelago across the maritime border with Kenya, concerns 
over resurgence of these vices are well founded. 
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4.7.1 Maritime Incidents in Lamu 
These can be characterized as either security related (terrorist/ piracy) or safety 
related (distress incidents like capsizing, man overboard and the like). The two 
outstanding security related incidents with landmark effect on Kenya’s maritime 
surveillance strategies in Lamu are visited below: 
In September 2011 a UK national, Judith Tebbutt, was kidnapped and her husband 
David killed following a terrorist raid on Kiwayu Island, one of the outlying remote 
Islands close to the maritime border with Somalia. A pirate gang released her six 
months later. Invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter, Kenya sent troops in mid-October 
2011 across the border to Somalia, in pursuit of the invaders. The military and political 
stalemate occasioned by this event remain outstanding to date.  
 
In another incident in June 2014, at least 48 people were killed in a terrorist raid in 
Mpeketoni, a trading center on the mainland 20 miles south-west of Lamu Island. This 
incident was another milestone in shaping up maritime surveillance strategies in the 
Lamu area. As depicted in figure 15 above, access to Mpeketoni is possible both by 
sea and by land. The first kidnap attack in October, 2011 was launched from the sea 
side.  
Figure 15: Mpeketoni in Lamu,  
Source Google maps 
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4.7.2 Safety related incidents. 
Based on IMO taxonomy and the code of “the International Standards and 
Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine 
Incident” (Casualty Investigation Code), boat accidents recorded along the Kenyan 
coastline between 2014 to 2016 were very serious - 14, serious – 14, less serious - 3 
and marine incidents - 10. 
Table 4: Maritime incidents recorded along the Kenyan Coastline 
Severity 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Very serious 3 2 9 14 
Serious 2 4 8 14 
Less serious 0 2 1 3 
Marine Incidents 1 4 5 10 
Total 6 12 23 41 
 
 
 
4.8 Analysis using Pareto 80-20 rule. 
“The Pareto rule is extremely helpful in bringing swift and easy clarity to complex 
situations and problems, especially when deciding where to focus effort and 
resources” (businessballs.com, 2017). Named after Vilfredo Pareto (1848 – 1923), it 
propagates the following widely accepted and empirically tested hypotheses (among 
others): 80% of results come from 20% of efforts, 80% of problems come from 20% 
of causes, and 80% of activity will require 20% of resources. 
The principle is broadly applicable in situations requiring rationalization, streamlining, 
and greater focus. A. Gorny, 2015, applied the principle to analyze occupational 
accidents in Poland. According to Gorny, “the tool helped in the identification of event 
causes and measures necessary to effectively reduce accident rates and severity” 
(Gorny, 2015). Based on his studies the empirical relationship whereby roughly 20% 
was helpful in effectively identifying the causes of the majority of problems was 
ascertained. With respect to accidents, one may assume that by diagnosing 20% of 
accident causes one can eliminate approximately 80% of the effects, which elevate 
accident rates and constitute the key driver of losses suffered by organizations.  
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Pareto analysis was also applied to the analysis of safety at sea by R. Ziarati, 2007. 
In his assessment, “Pareto focuses on the problems that offer the greatest potential 
for improvement, showing their relative frequency or size in descending order. It helps 
a team to concentrate on those causes which have greatest impact if remedied” 
(Ziarati, 2007) 
4.8.1 Analysis of the Kenyan scenario. 
Data on maritime incidents in Kenyan waters (Coastal and Inland) recorded at the 
RMRCC in Mombasa between 2014 to 2016, is depicted below. Although not 
considered in this analysis, incidents encountered in 2017 so far (by August 2017) 
has reached the level of 20. 
 
 
Incident 
type 
2014 2015 2016 Total 
 
 Descending 
order 
cumulative Percentage 
Collision 2 1 0 3  45 45 57.7% 
Capsizing 9 20 16 45  12 57 73.1% 
Flooding 0 2 0 2  7 64 82.1% 
Drifting 0 3 4 7  3 67 85.9% 
Man 
overboard 
0 1 0 1  3 70 89.7% 
Drowning 1 2 9 12  3 73 93.6% 
Unknown/ 
Vessel 
lost 
1 0 2 3  2 75 96.2% 
Fire 
onboard 
0 0 1 1  2 77 97.5% 
Grounding 0 3 0 3  1 78 98.7% 
Ditching 0 0 2 2  1 79 100% 
Pirated 0 0 0 0  0 79 100% 
Total 13 32 34 79     
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The main observation from this analysis is that there is need to place more focus on 
measures to minimize capsizing and drowning incidents. This is under the remit of 
Kenya Maritime Authority (with overall mandate on maritime safety). Either water 
ingress or heavy seas were responsible for most of these capsizing incidents. This 
calls for tightening of the regulatory regime round vessel inspections, to ensure overall 
compliance with safety and lifesaving appliances. 
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5 CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
 
5.0 Maritime surveillance in Papua New Guinea (PNG), A case study 
In this chapter, maritime surveillance of remote islands in Kenya is compared to that 
in Papua New Guinea. Kenya’s approach is labour intensive, relying more on patrols 
and regulatory vessel inspections, whereas following installation of state of the art 
surveillance system in remote locations, powered through solar and wind, PNG’s 
system can be deemed to be comparatively more technology intensive. 
5.0.1 Country background 
Papua New Guinea is an island state in the southwestern Pacific Ocean with 5,152 
km of coastline and 2.7 million square km of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Out of 
the country’s 22 provinces, fifteen are coastal or island provinces, providing home for 
Figure 16: Papua New Guinea,  
Source: Source: https://www.britannica.com/Papua-New-Guinea 
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some 60% of the national population. Much of the country’s coastline is only 
accessible by sea. The national capital, Port Moresby, is located in southeastern New 
Guinea on the Coral Sea.  
Papua New Guinea has been a member of the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) since 1976, and is a signatory to the following international maritime safety 
conventions: Load Lines Convention (1966), Tonnage Convention (1969), Collisions 
Prevention (COLREG) (1972), Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) (1974), Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers (STCWS), (1978), and 
Search and Rescue (SAR) (1979). The National Maritime Safety Authority (NMSA) is 
responsible for PNG’s compliance with the above international safety conventions.  
5.1 PNG Maritime Surveillance System. 
PNG’s maritime surveillance system was installed in 2013, at a cost of 48 Million US 
Dollars. It is an integrated system, incorporating Vessel Traffic Service (VTS), Vessel 
Traffic Management Information System (VTMIS) and Coastal Monitoring System 
(CMS). It comprises all the necessary components for integration of radar and AIS 
sensor data, real-time traffic data processing, GPS-time-stamped traffic data 
recording for farther playback, distribution of traffic data between displaying 
terminal(s), visual tracking of selected targets by long-range CCTV, VHF Voice 
Communication and VTS event data storage. The architecture of the system is 
presented in figure 17 below.  
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5.1.1 Discussion of the PNG Maritime Surveillance System: 
Papua New Guinea inland waterways covers some 
9,980 km2 within a coastline measured from the 
archipelagic baseline. NMSA monitors shipping and 
shipping activities via five terrestrial AIS base 
stations, three CMS stations, which also has AIS, 
RADAR, and VTS compliant Live CCTV capabilities. 
Other monitoring capabilities include the LRIT 
system and AMSA’s Craft Tracking System shared 
to NMSA under a data sharing agreement.  
A major area of challenge involves the detection and 
tracking of small objects and isolation of possible 
threats from legitimate shipping, fishing and other maritime activities. Issues that 
present overbearing challenges include gaps in detection of small targets, low-level 
coordination and information sharing between responsible agencies (fragmentation of 
organizations in the maritime security domain), limited inter-operability between 
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Figure 18: Papua New Guinea AIS 
Map 
Figure 17: Maritime Surveillance System for PNG, 
Source: National Maritime Safety Authority, Papua New Guinea 
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sectoral stakeholders and systems and the need to link up networks of heterogeneous 
sensors as an avenue to developing early warning systems.  
5.1.2 Power arrangements and energy profile: 
Papua New Guinea’s maritime surveillance system is fully powered from solar PV, 
with planned wind integration to provide back up and redundancy. The powering 
scheme of the system is tabulated below. As per the records of the National Maritime 
Safety Authority, only three power related issues have occurred. These were reported 
between August and September 2014 – shortly after commissioning of the system, 
and involved overload in the various sites. These were resolved through replacements 
with larger automatic restart marine circuit breakers. 
Table 5: PNG Maritime Surveillance System: Power demand, 
 Source:  National Maritime Safety Agency, PNG 
  
Unit 
 
Voltage 
Power 
Peak Mean 
1 Radar Sensor 9ft (9 ft) 25 kw 24 VDC 200 90 
2 Radar Processor 24 VDC 60 40 
3 AIS Base-station 12/ 24 VDC 70 70 
4 CCTV (MIC-400) 12/ 24 VDC 25 10 
5 RS/ IP Converter 10 – 30 VDC 19 10 
6 IP Relay plus Sensors 12/ 24 VDC 10 2 
7 LAN Switch 24 VDC 8 5 
8 Weather Station 5 – 32 VDC 1 1 
9 Enclosure Fans 24 VDC 10.4 5.2 
 Total Consumption 24 VDC 408.4 235.2 
     
 Average Power Consumption 321.8 Watts 
 Selected full system power for calculation 345 Watts 
 Calculated system current 14.375 Amps 
 Total usage in Ampere-hours in 24 hour period 345 Amps 
Solar Panel Calculations. 
1 % of total generation from wind turbine 0% 
2 Remaining power to be generated by solar 345 Amps 
3 Average sun-hours 6 
4 Solar power input from sun-hours 57.5 Amps 
5 Solar power required 1380 Watts 
6 Quantity of 330 Watts Solar Panels 4 Panels 
Battery Calculations 
 Description Total 
1 Load Current 345 AH 
2 Battery autonomy 3 Days 
3 Load Current with autonomy 1035 AH 
4 No. of 12 V, 100AH batteries 22 
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5.2 Improvement of Maritime Surveillance in Kenya 
This section reviews some actions and planning necessary, for the enhancement of 
maritime surveillance in Kenya’s coastal remote islands. The maritime situation along 
Kenya’s 614 km Coastline can be summarized as follows: there are piracy challenges 
towards the maritime border with Somalia, IUU fishing challenges along the entire 
stretch of the coastline, small boat safety concerns and constrained capacity in 
relation to maritime search and rescue services- specifically for small boats and 
passenger ferries. 
In Lamu area, (whose outlying remote islands constitute the main subject of this 
study), a Mega Port Project (LAPPSET) is underway therefore necessitating urgent 
paradigm shift by all stakeholders for safer navigation and use of the waterway, which 
will be open to international maritime traffic once the Lamu port commences 
operations. 
5.2.1 Policy context and key issues 
Interagency engagement has been a key pillar in Kenya’s maritime strategies. The 
synergies, which come with this approach, are reaffirmed by the overall improvements 
witnessed in both maritime safety and security in the country, following the 
establishment of a Presidential Blue Economy Committee in 2017. “A number of other 
Committees, including, Security, Border Management and Fisheries, deal with 
Kenya’s marine policy” (Bueger, 2017).  
Through revisions to the National Security Act, 2015, Kenya has codified her Inter-
Agency relations, which now provides the overarching legal framework for inter-
agency engagements in the pursuit of maritime safety and security. Much more can 
be achieved by extending this Inter-Agency engagement to the level of procurement 
of maritime surveillance equipment. This could involve encouraging joint procurement 
of monitoring equipment, whereby priority could be given to equipment that 
concurrently feeds the information needs of several agencies in the maritime sector, 
whilst applying renewable energy solution.  Such an approach would ensure 
sustainability and minimum operating costs. 
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5.2.2 Institutional framework for the improvement of Maritime Surveillance. 
The proposed roadmap borrows from the EU system, which is designed to deliver “a 
cost effective decentralized interconnection of different information layers that 
increases the efficiency of maritime surveillance systems by filling existing information 
gaps, while avoiding data duplication” (European Commission, 2010). The framework 
was recommended to the European Parliament by a special commission on the “Draft 
roadmap towards establishing the common information sharing environment for the 
surveillance of the EU Maritime Domain (COM 2010 – 584).  
Four steps are clearly mapped in this approach: (1) Identifying user communities, (2) 
Mapping of data sets and Gap Analysis, which involves identifying relevant data that 
each agency avails (supply mapping), its demand for data from other agencies 
(demand mapping) and indicating the legal basis for each data set. (3) Common data 
classification levels and (4) Developing the supporting framework. The framework is 
hereby contextualized to the maritime scenario in Kenya. In terms of step (1), the 
following user communities apply for the Kenyan case: 
a. Maritime Safety (including search and rescue, maritime security and prevention 
of pollution by ships) – Kenya Maritime Authority. 
b. Fisheries control – Ministry of Fisheries 
c. Marine Pollution Preparedness and Response – Oil Spill Mutual Assistance Group 
(OSMAG) 
d. Customs – Kenya Revenue Authority. 
e. Border Control – The Kenya Immigration Department. 
f. Law Enforcement – Kenya Maritime Police Unit. 
g. Defense – Kenya Navy 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
 
 
     Figure 19: Information Layers (Nonhierarchical),  
Adapted from: Integrating Maritime Surveillance, EC. 
5.2.3 Improvement of incident reporting: VHF Radio Repeater network. 
The effectiveness of technology was demonstrated in a study undertaken by the US 
Border and Maritime Security Division and NREL in 2013, in a joint research into the 
potential for renewable energy applications in border security. The study concluded 
that renewable energy technologies can provide sustainable, reliable power for a 
variety of applications within maritime surveillance. Their findings provide interesting 
impetus for consideration in this study. 
According to the Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, 2011, one major 
challenge with most surveillance systems stems from the fact that, “Maritime 
Surveillance systems are developed mainly for maritime safety purposes, and were 
not designed with sufficient attention to security aspects” (Centre for Strategy and 
Evaluation Services, 2011).  
Maritime surveillance in Kenya’s remote coastal islands can be improved through 
appropriate interagency information sharing arrangements and the installation of 
facilities and equipment to improve incident reporting.  
A technical field survey was conducted to identify suitable sites for VHF radio 
repeaters, within the remote coastal islands. The survey had specific eye on existing 
manned radio base stations by maritime stakeholders, the expectation being that 
Kenya Fisheries 
Kenya Maritime Authority 
Navy 
Maritime Police Unit 
Information Sharing 
VMS 
Vessel tracking (AIS, LRIT) 
Operational support 
Common database 
Common Information Sharing 
Environment 
MASURA 
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critical requirements such as security of equipment, would be granted. Although 
Kenya Maritime Authority has a broad remit in relation to maritime safety, she is still 
in the process of establishing presence along the coastline. So far, only one Rescue 
Sub-Centre is operational in Lamu. In the spirit of the National Security Act (2015), 
the focus of this survey was on sites/ radio base stations manned by the following 
Agencies: Kenya Maritime Police Unit, Kenya Wildlife Service, and Kenya Fisheries. 
Based on reports from the RMRCC in Mombasa, there have been claims of the 
existence of radio blind spots4 in some offshore areas, hence necessitating the 
installation of VHF radio repeaters. Therefore important parameters considered in this 
survey included: 
Range: whereby communication on VHF is limited to the line of sight (LOS) and the 
range is estimated using the formula:  
 
Range5 (km) = 4.12(√ H1+√𝐻2)  
 
Where H1 and H2 are the two effective antenna heights in meters.  For maritime 
communications, the antenna heights are referenced to height above sea level. Based 
on IMO guidelines for GMDSS shore-based facilities, it is assumed that antenna 
height on board ships may be as low as 4 meters.   
Distance between stations: VHF antennas with omnidirectional radiation provide 
circular coverage, hence some dips occur in the coverage areas between two 
adjacent stations and such dips are dependent on the distance between the antennas.  
Table 1 below indicates typical variations of range within the dips. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
4 Areas where complete degradation/ cancellation of the VHF signal is experienced as a result of 
topography. 
5 The equation for deduction of line of sight distance between two adjacent antennas. 
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Table 6: Dips in the VHF Range, 
Source: Eirik Bliksurd, 2016 
Distance 
between 
antennas 
1 times full 
range 
1.5 times 
full range 
1.7 times 
full range 
1.8 times 
full range 
1.9 times 
full range 
2 times full 
range 
Range in 
the dip as a 
percentage 
of full range 
87% 66% 53% 44% 31% 0% 
 
Figure 20: Dips in the VHF Range 
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Table 7: Range for various antenna heights                                                   
 
5.2.4 Antenna arrangement: 
Maritime VHF service employs frequency modulation (FM) and vertical polarization, 
using half-wave omnidirectional dipole antennas in the horizontal plane with 2.15 dBi 
antenna gain. The VHF wavelength is 2 meters. Both single dipoles and folded dipoles 
may be used. The single dipole has approximately 75-ohm antenna impedance, 
Shore based 
antenna 
height above 
sea level (mts) 
Calculated 
range (mts) 
 SITE Government 
Agencies 
Coordinates Elevation 
Mts. 
 10 21  Shimoni Kenya 
Fisheries 
K.W.S 
 KMPU 
40 39’ 48” S, 
390 21’ 06” E 
2 
15 24  Msambweni  K.M.P.U 40 28’ 36” S, 
390 28’ 36” E 
10 
20 27  Lamu KMA Site 
offices 
20 17’ 49” S, 
400 54’ 47” E 
20 
25 29  Kiunga  K.W.S 
K.M.P.U 
10 44’ 53” S, 
410 29’ 24” E 
10 
30 31  Kiwayu Kenya Police 20 0’ 58” S, 
410 15’ 54” E 
3 
35 33  Kipini K.W.S 
Kenya Police  
20 31’ 22” S, 
400 32’ 20” E 
5 
40 34  Malindi K.W.S 30 07’ 51” S, 
400 21’ 06” E 
10 
45 36  Watamu K.W.S 40 39’ 48” S, 
400 21’ 06” E 
3 
50 47  Ngomeni K.M.P.U 
Kenya 
Fisheries 
20 59’ 39” S, 
400 12’ 09” E 
40 
100 49  Kilifi Kenya 
Fisheries 
30 38’ 05” S, 
390 50’ 44” E 
5 
   Mtwapa K.W.S 
Kenya Police 
line 
40 39’ 48” S, 
390 21’ 06” E 
2 
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whereas the folded dipole has similar radiation properties, but the impedance is 300 
ohms and a larger frequency bandwidth of the antenna. 
For VHF systems operating on more than one channel in the one-frequency simplex 
mode with individual antennas on frequencies in the same band, the antennas are 
installed at different levels in a straight vertical line, one antenna above the other as 
per the figure below. The distance between the extremes of the different antennas 
should be at least one wavelength. 
5.2.5 Proposed Station Solution: 
It is assumed that each station would handle DSC distress calls (channel 70), voice 
distress/safety and calling on channel 16, navigation information on channels AIS 1 
and AIS 2, and voice communications. The figure below indicates schematic structure 
of the station solution operating on channel 70, channel 16, the terrestrial AIS 
channels and one voice communication in accordance with ITU Radio Regulations 
Appendix 18. The AIS equipment would operate on both AIS 1 (161.975 MHz) and 
AIS 2 (162. 025 MHz).  
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Figure 21: VHF antenna structure 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Proposed VHF coverage area,  
Source: Google map 
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5.2.6 Estimated solar power requirement for each station: 
Data from the Solar and Wind Resource Assessment (SWERA), a UNEP supported 
global initiative, projects that the wind resource along the Kenyan coastline averages 
5 – 7 m/s at 50 metres height, while for solar, the country receives an average of 4.5 
KWh/m2 per day (Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, 2013). With these average 
figures, the renewable energy resources are in sufficient quantities for standard 
application in the maritime surveillance domain. For the VHF Radio repeater network, 
the estimates for solar energy requirement per site is presented in table 4 below. 
Table 8: Solar PV requirement per VHF Repeater site,  
Source: Solar PV Quotation by Wilken Telecommunications (K) Ltd 
Item Quantity Watts Total Wattage Operating 
hours 
Watthours 
130 W 
Panel 
1 130 130 24 3120 
    Total 3120 
Item Description Items QTY 
Batteries 12V, 200 AH 1.87777 2 
140 Watt 
Panels 
 2.857142857 3 
Inverter 36 watts   
Charge 
controller 
30 Amps   
 
5.3 Conclusion 
This paper has examined the subject of maritime surveillance in Kenya’s remote 
coastal islands, and established a justification for improvements in the current state 
of facilities and arrangements. These improvements can be realized piecemeal, 
through the establishment of an enabling policy framework, strengthening inter-
agency engagement and then applying appropriate technology. Following the 
enactment of the National Security Act, 2015, the stage is already well set for active 
inter-agency participation. At the regional and international levels, it is important to 
harness the networks established through cooperation agreements and memoranda 
of understanding (such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct) and more recently the 
Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centres. 
58 
 
This study also investigated the possibilities of solar power in maritime surveillance 
applications and ascertained that energy requirements for powering a single VHF 
repeater can range between 312 watts per site to 3180 watts for a complete maritime 
surveillance package, as per the Papua New Guinea System..  
Owing to various site-specific parameters including land acquisition process in Kenya, 
the ascertainment of full cost requires the consideration of various additional factors 
and externalities, and is therefore recommended as the subject of future research. 
5.4 Recommendations 
Other operational measures, alongside the discussed measures include, 
strengthening Beach Management Units (BMUs). BMUs in Kenya are established in 
accordance with the provisions of the Fisheries Act, (Beach Management 
Regulations, 2007 Cap 378). Among other important functions, BMUs provide an 
avenue for strengthening the management of fish landing sites, fishery resources and 
aquatic environment. More importantly, they are equipped to prevent or mitigate 
conflicts in the fisheries sector (FAO, 2012). According to Ngige and Jaeckel, 2007, 
the essence of BMUs is that “it creates a link and a partnership between the 
government level and artisanal fishermen.  
Along Kenya’s Indian Ocean coastline, there are 27 BMUs and 209 fish landing sites 
(KMA, 2015). A close collaboration exists between Fisheries, BMUs and the Maritime 
Authority in Kenya. Kenya Maritime Authority has dependability on BMU members’ 
skills who are normally the first to arrive on-scene whenever local fishing and small 
passenger boats are involved in accident. This makes them dependable partners on 
search and rescue operations involving small boats. Through sensitization and 
general awareness campaigns, BMUs can be made proactive partners in relation to 
developing a resilient Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) structure to cope with 
maritime crime in Kenya’s coastal remote islands. 
 
The author recommends further research into how the following renewable energy 
options can be harnessed for both mobile and fixed maritime surveillance 
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applications: photovoltaics, wind, energy transfer (batteries), energy transfer 
(wireless), and fuel cells.
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7 Appendix 1 Levelised cost of Renewable Energy 
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7.1 Appendix 2 
 
Solar PV Project Cost Calculator Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) - Coastal Surveillance August, 2017
Inputs highlighted in Yellow
LCOE Calculator
System Inputs Input Description Year
Production 
(kWh)
Direct Purchase 
Cost ($)
O&M 
Cost ($)
PPA Escalator 
(%)
PPA Rate 
($/kWh)
PPA Cost 
($)
System Size (kW-DC) 3 (Please insert the aggregate system size for a site) 0 2,308$                     -
1st-Year Production (kWh) 187                (Please insert the aggregate forecasted system production at a site 1 187                  45$           0.1500$    28$            
Annual Degradation 0.50% (Please insert the expected system yearly performance degradation) 2 186                  46$           3% 0.1545$    29$            
3 185                  48$           3% 0.1591$    29$            
Direct Purchase Inputs 4 184                  49$           3% 0.1639$    30$            
Cost ($/W) 0.769$          
(Please insert total system cost per Watt. If not available, use the 
formula:
Cost ($/W) = (Total-system-cost/Total-system-size-in-watts) 5 183                  51$           3% 0.1688$    31$            
Initial Rebate/Incentive -$              
(Please insert the total value of rebates/incentives received within the 
first year) 6 183                  52$           3% 0.1739$    32$            
O&M Cost ($/kW) 15.00$          (Please insert the per kW O&M cost. If not available, use the formula:
O&M Cost ($/kW) = (1st-year-O&M-Cost/Total-system-size-in-kW) 7 182                  54$           3% 0.1791$    33$            
O&M Escalator (%) 3% (Please insert the expected yearly escalation) 8 181                  55$           3% 0.1845$    33$            
9 180                  57$           3% 0.1900$    34$            
PPA Inputs 10 179                  59$           3% 0.1957$    35$            
PPA Rate ($/kWh) 0.15000$     (Please insert the per kWh PPA Rate. If not available, use the formula:
PPA Rate ($/kWh) = (1st-year-PPA-Cost/1st-year-system-prduction) 11 178                  60$           3% 0.2016$    36$            
PPA Escalator 3.00%
(Please insert the expected yearly escalation. If not uniform, manually 
insert yearly escalation in Column I) 12 177                  62$           3% 0.2076$    37$            
13 176                  64$           3% 0.2139$    38$            
14 175                  66$           3% 0.2203$    39$            
LCOE Outputs* 15 175                  68$           3% 0.2269$    40$            
Direct Purchase * Compare to expected utility costs over the next 20 years 16 174                  70$           3% 0.2337$    41$            
20 Year 0.98473$     17 173                  72$           3% 0.2407$    42$            
25 Year 0.89539$     18 172                  74$           3% 0.2479$    43$            
19 171                  77$           3% 0.2554$    44$            
PPA * Compare to expected utility costs over the next 20 years 20 170                  79$           3% 0.2630$    45$            
20 Year 0.20054$     21 169                  81$           3% 0.2709$    46$            
25 Year 0.21709$     22 168                  84$           3% 0.2790$    47$            
23 168                  86$           3% 0.2874$    48$            
Item Unit Cost (Ksh)Total Cost (Ksh) 24 167                  89$           3% 0.2960$    49$            
2 x 12V, 200 AH Batteries 31800 63600 25 166                  91$           3% 0.3049$    51$            
3 x 140 watt panels 17017 17017 Total 4,410               2,308$                     1,641$     957$          
1 x 375 watt inverter 16575 16575
1 x charge controller 25089 25089 Item Description Quantity QTY
Electrical assessories 25000 25000 Batteries 12V, 200 AH 1.87777 2
Installation 25000 25000 140 Watt Panels 2.857142857 3
Total 206315 Inverter 36 Watts
16% VAT 33010 Charge Controller 30 Amps
239,325 Total 23.3333
1 Ksh = US$ 0.01 Production per s i te = 3120 watts  = 187.2 KWh
239325 = 2393.25 
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7.2 Maritime incidents recorded in Kenyan waters (Source RMRCC Mombasa) 
N
O.  
DATE COAST REGION INCIDENT/ ACCIDENT 
TYPE 
CAUSE REMARKS 
1 01/05/2
014 
Malindi Marine N. 
Park 
Not stated Not stated No Casualties 
2 03/11/2
014 
Mombasa - Neptune 
Beach Hotel 
Collision Jetski rammed 
into a boat 
1 died 
3 16/12/2
014 
Lamu Collision Human error 1 died 
4 20/11/2
014 
Mombasa Marine 
park 
Capsized Rough 
Weather 
5 rescued 
5 21/11/2
014 
Kipini Capsized Rough 
Weather 
1died 
6 22/12/2
014 
Mombasa Marine 
park 
Capsized Rough 
Weather 
6 rescued 
7 2/1/201
5 
Diani - South Coast Capsized Rough 
weather 
4 persons rescued 
8 10/1/20
15 
Diani - South Coast Vessel flooding Aground 15 persons rescued 
9 14/01/2
015 
Lamu Vessel Adrift Mechanical 
Problems 
Vessel repaired 
10 19/01/2
015 
Kisite mpunguti 
Area 
Grounding Vessel ran 
aground 
12 crew rescued 
11 6/4/201
5 
North coast - 
whitesands Beach 
Capsizing                     - 3 Children rescued, 9 
bodies recovered 
12 19/05/2
015 
Kiwayu - Shimo La 
Tewa 
Capsizing                            
- 
4 persons rescued 
13 25/05/2
015 
Malindi Marine N. 
Park 
Taking on Water Mechanical 
Problems 
Vessel repaired 
14 9/7/201
5 
Mkundeni - Lamu Capsizing Strong 
Currents 
3 Rescued 1 Died 
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15 24/7/20
15 
Lamu Capsizing                   - 2 Rescued 3 Died 
16 25/7/20
15 
Lamu Capsizing                         
- 
2 Rescued. 
17 23/08/2
015 
Lamu Accident - swimming 
person 
Human error 1 rescued 
18 22/9/20
15 
Mambrui Malindi Grounding Hitting Sand 
Dune 
20 crew all rescued. 
19 19/10/2
015 
Mombasa  Drifting Failed 
steering 
2 Rescued 
20 20/01/2
016 
Shimoni Lost Vessel Drifting, lost 
main sail 
4 persons Rescued 
21 28/02/2
016 
Lamu - Manda bay Capsizing Strong waves 2 rescued 
22 11/3/20
16 
Magogoni Capsizing                _                      _ 
23 28/03/2
016 
Dongo Kundu Drowning                _ 1 Body found 
24 15/04/2
016 
Mtwapa bridge Drowning Diving. 
Human error 
1 Body found 
25 10/5/20
16 
Mkokoni - lamu Capsizing Unknown 2 persons rescued 
26 17/05/2
016 
Shimoni Overdue.drifted  due to 
mechanical failure 
Fishing 5 Kenyans on board 
26 24/05/2
016 
Junda creek Drowning     
28 25/05/2
016 
Likoni Drowning     
29 28/05/2
016 
Mtwapa Creek Drowning               _ 1 Body found 
30 6/6/201
6 
Likoni Channel Ditched Mechanical 
Problems 
1 body retrieved 
69 
 
31 9/6/201
6 
Mkandani (Kililawa 
channel) 
capsized Hit a rock  All 18 passengers 
rescued 
32 13/06/2
016 
English point Capsized Strong waves All 6 people on board 
rescued 
33 7/7/201
6 
Diani - near Congo 
Mosque 
Drowning Strong waves 1 died 
34 26/7/20
16 
Mtwapa Creek Capsized Rough 
Weather 
2 swam to safety, 1 
drowned 
35 26/7/20
16 
Pemba channel Drifting Engine 
Breakdown 
towed by Swabil Jamil 
boat 5 rescued 
36 29/7/20
16 
Mtwapa Drowning Rough 
Weather 
2 swam to safety, 2 
drowned 
37 2/8/201
6 
Tudor creek Capsizing Rough 
Weather 
2 swam to safety , 1 
drowned 
38 17/08/2
016 
Diani - Tiwi Drowning Strong waves 2 died 
39 24/08/2
016 
Lamu Capsizing Rough 
Weather 
4 rescued 
40 29/08/2
016 
Mvudheni (Lamu - 
Kiunga) 
Capsizing Rough 
Weather 
5 rescued 
41 6/9/201
6 
Msambweni Capsizing Rough 
Weather 
12 survived 4 dead 
      
N
O.  
DATE LAKE REGION INCIDENT/ ACCIDENT 
TYPE 
CAUSE REMARKS 
1 10/01/2
014 
Sumba Channel (L. 
Victoria) 
Possibly Capsizement Rough 
Weather 
No Casualties 
2 18/04/2
014 
Masinga Dam Capsizement Rough 
weather 
1 died. 
3 12/05/2
014 
Lake Naivasha Drowning Falling 
overboard 
1 died 
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4 18/05/2
014 
Lake Naivasha Capsizement Waves and 
panic hence 
alteration of 
the vessel 
stability 
2 died 
5 11/11/2
014 
Wakondo - Lusinga 
Island 
Capsized   Hippo 
knocked down 
boat 
1 died 3 swam to safety 
6 18/11/2
014 
Budalangi Capsized Not stated 1 died  
7 18/11/2
014 
Luyoro - Turkana Capsized Overloading 
and bad 
weather 
1 person died 7 were 
rescued 
8 8/1/201
5 
Kusa Beach - Lake 
Victoria 
Trapped Stuck in 
hyacinth 
2 persons rescued 
9 29/03/2
015 
Lake Turkana Capsizing Overloading 11 people rescued, 
10 13/4/20
15 
Gwassi, North 
Mbita 
Capsizing Old boat 2 men died 
11 15/04/2
015 
Kisagi, Gwassi 
Mbita 
Capsizing Unknown 3 persons saved 
12 17/04/2
015 
Uterere Beach Capsizing Unknown 3 Fishermen rescued 
13 19/04/2
015 
Kisegi Beach, Guasi 
North 
Capsizing Old boat 2 persons rescued 
14 13/05/2
015 
Shelly Beach Engine Failure Going for 
repair 
2 persons rescued 
15 16/05/2
015 
Luyoro - Turkana Capsizing Bad weather 4 persons rescued 
16 27/05/2
015 
Busia Capsizing Strong Winds 2 drowned 1 survived 
17 19/06/2
015 
Nyandiwa, Suba Sinking Drifting, Hit 
rocks 
3 drowned, 3 rescued 
18 2/7/201
5 
Omena Beach Drowning Drunkardness 1 Person died 
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19 11/7/20
15 
Longech - Turkana Capsizing Unknown 4 Rescued 
20 5/8/201
5 
Homabay Sori Collision No lighting at 
night 
2 Children perished, 21 
adults rescued.The boat 
was sailling without 
lights. 
21 12/8/20
15 
lake Naivasha Capsizing Strong winds 3 Rescued 3 Died 
22 4/10/20
15 
Asebo - bay , L. 
Victoria 
Capsizing Bad weather 1rescued 1 died 
23 18/10/2
015 
Uganda waters Drowning dropped in the 
water 
1 died 
24 23/11/2
015 
River Sio Busia Capsizing Swell of River 
Sio 
2 Rescued 2 Drowned 
25 25/02/2
016 
Masinga Dam Capsizing Overloading 3 Rescued 2 Drowned 
26 2/4/201
6 
Sori Beach Capsizing Unknown 2 drowned 
27 25/6/20
16 
Liunda Beach to 
Denda Island  
  Capsizing Strong winds 9 rescued 9 drowned 
28 4/7/201
6 
Kisiu Beach Drowning Hippo attack 1 person died 
29 4/7/201
6 
Mahanga beach Capsizing Hit rocks 2 survived , 2 drowned 
30 7/7/201
6 
Misori beach Capsizing Strong Winds 2 Rescued 2 Drowned 
31 16/8/20
16 
Mageta - Usenge 
Island 
Capsizing Strong waves 1survived 1 drowned 
32 24/08/2
016 
Lake Kenyatta Drowning slipped 1 dead 
33 9/9/201
6 
Kisumu port Fire on board Engine room 5 rescued 
 
